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Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs), by Robert Jervis
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Review
"In Why Intelligence Fails, Jervis examines two important U.S. intelligence lapses―the fall of the Shah in Iran and WMDs in Iraq―and tries to account for what went awry. After both, the CIA hired Jervis―a longtime student of international affairs―to help the agency sort out its mistakes. He thus brings an invaluable perspective as a smart outsider with sufficient inside access to appraise the agency's blind spots." (Gabriel Schoenfeld Wall Street Journal)"In this cogently argued and revealing book, Jervis, a veteran CIA consultant, uses the Iranian and Iraqi cases to dissect why, in some circumstances, intelligence fails to provide accurate analysis to policymakers.... The section on Iran... identifies a number of errors with respect to intelligence on Iran, ranging from the mistaken belief that the shah was strong enough to undertake decisive and sustained action against his opponents to underestimating the role played by religion and nationalism in Iranian society. In the section on Iraq... Jervis contends that the fundamental reason for the WMD intelligence failure was that it made the most sense to assume that the country possessed WMD, given the Iraqi government's previous behavior. Highly recommended for all interested academic and general readers." (Library Journal)"Jervis's practical experience is as a consultant with the CIA, and he offers a refreshing analysis and defense of this engagement with a government agency. Why Intelligence Fails feels like a reflection on a lifetime of thinking about intelligence.... The case studies (one of which is a slightly redacted version of the lessons-learned report Jervis wrote for the CIA about the Iranian Revolution, complete with comments made on it by senior CIA figures) ably highlight the lessons Jervis wishes us to take away from his study. Most importantly, he argues that further reforms of the intelligence machinery―a favorite reflex of politicians―will not necessarily produce improvements to intelligence product." (Robert Dover International Affairs)"Why Intelligence Fails is a valuable and unique book combining a quasi-memoir from an eminent political scientist, well-applied theory, and two important case studies, with a healthy regard for 'insoluble dilemmas of intelligence and policy-making.'" (Bruce W. Jentleson, Duke University)"There is no one better than Robert Jervis at dissecting intelligence, and this book is proof. Happily, at long, long last he has managed to free his three-decade-old inside postmortem on intelligence failure during the early stages of the Iranian revolution from the dark of classification, and he has coupled that with his recent writings on intelligence's woeful performance over those Iraqi weapons of mass destruction that weren't. His conclusion is both wise and discomfiting: In both cases, doing better 'would have been to make the intelligence judgments less certain rather than to reach fundamentally different conclusions. Furthermore, better intelligence would not have led to an effective policy.'" (Gregory F. Treverton, RAND Corporation)"This is the sort of thorough, integrative, and provocative work we've come to expect from Robert Jervis. Students of the craft will find much to debate and ponder in this thoughtful assessment." (John McLaughlin, Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University)
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About the Author
Robert Jervis is Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics at Columbia University. He is the author of many books, including The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy and The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, both from Cornell, and, most recently, American Foreign Policy in a New Era.
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Product details
Series: Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
Hardcover: 248 pages
Publisher: Cornell University Press; First Edition edition (February 4, 2010)
Language: English
ISBN-10: 9780801447853
ISBN-13: 978-0801447853
ASIN: 0801447852
Product Dimensions:
6.1 x 0.8 x 9.2 inches
Shipping Weight: 1.1 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
Average Customer Review:
3.9 out of 5 stars
13 customer reviews
Amazon Best Sellers Rank:
#457,614 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
Using two case studies, one about the fall of the Shah in Iran and the other about the WMD failures the author shows how and why intelligence organizations fail. The premise that he sells in this relatively short book (<300 pages) is that intelligence analysts both don't know how to ask questions of others and are given a chance to really become subject matter experts in areas. Some of this the author blames on the apparent lack of analysts to foster connections outside of their bubble inside an organization. Such as the CIA analysts always talking to CIA analysts and not to folks over at State or even going over to Georgetown and asking some of the think tanks there. The other major blame he has for intelligence failures is that there appears to be no or limited "interest" in setting folks up to become subject matter experts. Thru the use of anecdotal information, the author who was a contractor at the time of the Iranian Revolution to the CIA, shows that there were folks who not only didn't speak Farsi; some of them had never been to the region or had studied it in depth beyond the fact book published by the CIA and was depending on folks at the embassy to provide information. Most of whom were out of their element and were Russian linguists or Russian experts to work the intelligence gathering apparatus directed towards the USSR at the time. After throwing out this summary of information for the Iranian revolution as well as how he became involved in a postmortem report on what went wrong. The author then republishes all the un-redacted parts of his report that was declassified about the failures of intelligence during the Iranian Revolution up to the summer of 1978 when the Shah abdicated. The biggest problem here though is that this is typical bureaucratic writing and it is very dry. Even for what should be an informational book from a professor. This report easily makes up over 70% of the pages in the book.The rest of the book is made up of a postmortem that the author did on his own based on released information and experiences within the CIA to show that even the story that most folks were told by the media about the WMD hunt and cause belli for Iraq wasn't so much wrong. Nor was it politicized, he makes this point numerous times through out the last half of the book. Rather it that because of a successful deception campaign and misdirection campaign by the Hussein government. Most of the intelligence seemed to point to the fact that the Iraqis were trying to get WMDs started again. The author then explains that there was so much evidence that seemed to point this way as well as biases already set in by the analysts they saw that it was easy to draw the conclusions that they drew. Even when there was evidence to the contrary, simply because "guilty people have reason to hide stuff". Therefore, the failure here the author explains is again that folks didn't know the region well, even though we had been watching for 20+ years, because there was a serious draw down of experience from the end of the Cold War to the start of the War on Terror. As well folks rotating in and thru and around the various desks all through out the intelligence communities in both the US and the UK seemed to carry their baggage about Iraq with them. Therefore, just as before with Iran, key evidence was missed or dismissed as not useful to talk about. The experience levels weren't there and in the end the failures were more from the lack of interests and lack of time to develop a coherent policy about what was being seen versus what was actually being written up in a final product. In the Iranian case, events happened so fast that there was no time to throw out the alternative explanations. While in Iraq, there was so much time that once an idea set in it grew to be the permanent idea within the community even before the policy makers in the government pushed for the information to bend to fit the policy being drafted.The fixes proposed by the author are interesting, but if you have studied the intelligence community in any depth by outsiders or even insiders; they are the same ones that have been tossed around since the Stansfield Turner as the head of the CIA and Church Hearings days.This is an interesting book, but not really a 4 or even 3 full stars book; mainly because the middle of this gets muddled down with a redacted paper that is over 30 years old written in dry government language that seems to take forever to wade thru with findings or suggestions for improvements. I would suggest giving it a whirl if only because the author offers up a different take on the debacle that was the intelligence on the Iraqi WMDs that might be different than the official line in the government and the official line that was pushed by the media.
Undoubtedly the most interesting portion of this very interesting book, is the CIA sponsored post-mortem report on why the Iranian Revolution caught CIA by surprise. Remarkably, this report is presented in full with very few redactions and includes the critiques of the report by senior CIA officials. As such it makes for fascinating reading.The brief given to Jervis (then a part time CIA consultant) and an unnamed CIA officer who was to assist in this work was to concentrate on the specific issue of the analytic tradecraft employed by CIA Iranian analysts prior to the revolution. On the whole Jervis and his shadowy assistant produced what appears to be a very fair report. This report concluded that given the information available to them, the two CIA political analysts assigned to Iran did a pretty credible job. One of these analysts was actually an Iranian target expert and Farsi linguist.Yet it is clear that these analysts took a very narrow view of their specialty and failed to place political events in the context of social and economic changes then effecting Iran. They also failed to make use of open source information on Iran or examine the strong Shia religious influences affecting Iran. As Jervis noted in his report what was then CIA's office of political analysis failed to communicate with its office of economic analysis. Further the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Iran failed to communicate with any of the analysts working Iran or to provide any guidance to them. Although his brief specifically did not include collection issues, Jervis also noted that the U.S. Embassy staff in Tehran (including CIA officers) included no Farsi speakers and did not have significant contacts outside of the Iranian Government.The CIA response to this report is quite illuminating if not surprising. They ignored his comments about lack of internal communication between the political and economic analyst, between CIA analysts and State INR analysts, and between the NIO and working analysts. They also ignored his comment about the cultural isolation of CIA officers in Tehran. They did however make a great deal of his general exoneration of CIA analysts on the narrow grounds that the information they were using was quite limited. And of course there was a good deal of bureaucratic posturing to demonstrate that no one at CIA could be blamed for this failure.The second post-mortem that Jervis provides in this book that he did on his own dime, is a review of the notorious National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that argued that Saddam Hussein's Iraq had an active program for building Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In this effort Jervis again makes a successful effort to present a fair and balanced account of how CIA produced such a completely incorrect NIE. In the course of doing so he provides very good discussions of the sensitive issue of political influence on intelligence production and conversely of the role of intelligence in policy formulation.This is a good book for intelligence aficionados and for anyone trying to understand how the U.S. intelligence system actually works.
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